“Cellular basis of consciousness”: Not just radical but wrong by Key, Brian
Animal Sentience 2016.137:  Key on Reber on Origins of Mind 
 
 1 
“Cellular basis of consciousness”: Not just radical but wrong 
Commentary on Reber on Origins of Mind 
 
 
Brian Key 
School of Biomedical Sciences 
University of Queensland 
 
Abstract:  Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred 
to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly 
twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a 
sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological 
foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a 
fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems. 
This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a 
misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness hypothesis has 
little explanatory and predictive power with regards to subjective experience.  
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Reber (2016) proposes that “any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its 
surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind 
and consciousness.” Although he provides no evidence for his belief that organisms “have 
minds because minds are an inherent component of organic form,” Reber is at least upfront 
in declaring his power to decide which organic matter can be conscious (plants and fungi are 
excluded). Reber proposes that the standard explanations of the role of neural tissue in 
subjective experience are flawed because they depend on a “miracle” to bring forth 
consciousness. He believes that because the neural basis of subjective experience is not 
understood, a “miracle” must be needed to explain it. This conclusion is unreasonable. For 
example, from the fact that the structure of DNA was unknown before 1953 it does not 
follow that explanations of DNA structure relied on a miracle before that time. The unknown 
should not be equated with the need for some miracle. Interestingly, having raised the 
notion that scientific approaches to subjective experience were dependent on a miracle, 
Reber admits that his own hypothesis relies on a miracle since he gets to choose which types 
of organic matter can be conscious (but he justifies this as just a little miracle).  
Reber arrives at his so-called solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness by 
appealing to the idea that the emergence of subjective experience must conform to 
evolutionary principles (at least, as he understands them). He stresses that significant 
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functions, such as subjective experience could not possibly arise suddenly and mysteriously 
only in humans because evolution progresses slowly over time. On this basis he believes that 
a form of subjective experience emerged early in the timeline of human evolution and was 
subsequently and progressively modified to become more complex and powerful. Post-hoc 
reasoning can sometimes be correct when dealing with an entity that is concrete in form and 
unambiguously identified in all animals, such as the nucleus. However, when a function such 
as subjective experience arises late in the timeline of human evolution and is also not easily 
observed or quantified, this reasoning fails. In the latter case what is needed is an 
independent marker of subjective experience to reveal its presence in close and distantly 
related species (Key, 2015; Key, 2016). Reber mistakenly chooses his own unsubstantiated 
markers of “flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion.”  
Reber does not appreciate that novel and significant form and function can emerge 
any time during evolution through genetic modifications. Precusors or rudimentary versions 
of these characteristics do not need to have existed in earlier common ancestors. One 
example is gene duplication; it enables genes to take on new and innovative functions not 
shared by early organisms. EvoDevo abounds with examples of the emergence and spread of 
novelty (genetic and phenotypic) in animal populations (Peterson, 2016). 
What most people will find difficult to accept is that Reber’s hypothesis extends 
beyond animals with nervous systems to single cell organisms. While there is nothing unique 
in proposing that only animals have the capacity for subjective experience, it is rather a long 
bow to draw to suggest that organisms without a nervous system possess subjective 
awareness (unless the definition of subjective experience is radically changed to remove its 
subjective nature). The power of any good hypothesis is revealed by its ability to (i) make 
new predictions that are experimentally testable and capable of advancing knowledge, and 
(ii) explain existing knowledge and future observations. Unfortunately, Reber’s hypothesis 
fails on both accounts with respect to subjective experience. What we are presented with is 
a weak hypothesis with little explanatory or predictive power.  
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